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Time to plug the UK security gap: why there is a need to widen surveillance on 
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Introduction 
 This paper examines whether there is a need for the UK to introduce legislation 
regarding further surveillance powers for the intelligence and policing agencies to conduct 
surveillance on electronic communications data. Both legally and politically t is a 
controversial issue. One side of the debate argues the need for such powers in order to assist 
the intelligence and policing agencies in their investigations, especially in relation to 
preventing acts of terrorism  occurring to keep citizens safe from such attacks. The other side 
of the debate raises serious concerns of rights to privacy and data protection with the main 
issue being on the lack of sufficient safeguards against abuses by the agencies in their 
acquisition and retention of communications data.  
 By looking at the current terrorist threat facing the EU (which includes the UK) 
focusing mainly on the threat the terrorist group Islamic State pose considerations are given 
to both sides of the debate. This includes an examination in how Islamic State use electronic 
communications, especially its social media sources by using the example of their use of 
Twitter and issues surrounding the difficulty policing agencies are having in monitoring this 
group’s activities on communications sources.  By having such agencies monitoring 
electronic communications use raises concerns over the surveillance society, a concern that 
was exacerbated by the former US National Security Agency (NSA), Edward Snowden’s 
revelations in how, why and what the NSA was monitoring and its relationship with the UK’s 
intelligence agency, General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
By looking at what communications is subject to the requests for wider surveillance 
this paper will examine the current legislative provisions authorising surveillance by the 
intelligence and policing agencies surveillance of electronic communications. This includes 
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an analysis of the findings of the European Union’s court, the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) decision in the Digital Rights case where after deciding that the EU’s legislative 
provisions on data protection were insufficient resulted in the UK introducing the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 that allows intelligence and policing agencies 
to request from communications providers electronic communications data related to their 
investigations. With the 2014 Act having a sunset clause expiring in December 2016 and 
taking into account recent Parliamentary reports, it is examined if there is a need for a new 
legislation in the UK that codifies al the current legislation governing the surveillance of 
electronic communications. This looks more likely as the Queen’s Speech in May 2015 
revealed an Investigatory Powers Bill will be introduced  during the 2015/16 Parliament. The 
position submitted here is that new legislation is needed as wider powers are required to 
allow the intelligence and policing agencies the ability to monitor terrorist group’s increasing 
sophisticated and wide use of electronic communications, provided there are sufficient 
safeguards related to data protection. Those safeguards can only be truly secured via judicial 
supervision in granting the respective authorities to the intelligence and policing agencies.  
Underpinning this submission is that due to the international nature of the terrorist threat 
facing national states and the use by terrorist groups of communications, we have moved to 
an era where intelligence in no longer on a ‘need to know’ basis to one where it is a ‘need to 
share’. This includes obtaining the co-operation of internet and communications service 
providers. 
The Terrorist Threat to the EU 
The civil war in Syria and the control of large parts of Iraq by Islamic State has 
allowed a vacuum to exist enabling Islamist groups, in particular Islamic State (also referred 
to as ISIL) and the Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra Front to flourish and become more 
powerful in the region. These groups pose a threat to the security of the Syrian/Iraqi region 
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and to the security of nations around the world, including EU Member States. The threat is 
posed on two fronts. Firstly the number of citizens from nation states outside Syria and Iraq 
who have gone to these countries to join Islamist terror groups. In January 2015 from two EU 
Member States it is estimated that 600 UK citizens and 1,500 French citizens have travelled 
to Syria to join Islamic State.1  
Country Estimated number of 
citizens travelling to 
join Islamic State in 
Syria, September 
2014 
Estimated increase in 
number of citizens 
travelling to join 
Islamic State in Syria, 
January 2015 
Total number of 
citizens travelling to 
join Islamic State in 
Syria 
France 900 500 1,400 
UK 400 200 600 
Germany 320 280 600 
Belgium 350 100 450 
Table 1: Number of Citizens joining Islamic State in Syria (Sources: Mezzfiorie (2014), Murray (2014), 
Maminghano (2014), BBC News (2015a)) 
 
A major concern for EU Member States is those returning from conflict zones who see their 
home state as an enemy resulting in these citizens being more likely to plan and carry out 
terrorist attacks in their home state. Recent examples of this include: 
1. May 2014, Brussels, Belgium, four people killed at the Jewish Museum in 
Brussels by an Islamic State militant, Muhdi Nemmouche;2 
2. January 2015, Paris, France, attack on the offices of the French satirical magazine, 
Charlie Hebdo where Cherif and Said Kouachi killed twelve people, ten of the 
magazine’s staff and two police officers who were protecting the building;3 
3. January 2015, Paris, France, 8th January 2015 Amedy Coulibaly killed a 
policewoman and injured another police officer outside a Metro station in Paris 
and on the 9th January he took a number of people hostage in a Jewish 
                                                          
1 Douglas Murray ‘Our boys in the Islamic State: Britain’s export jihad’ The Spectator 23rd August 2014 
retrieved from http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9293762/the-british-beheaders/ [accessed 12th 
September 2014] 
2 Kevin Rawlinson ‘Jewish museum, shooting suspect is Islamic state torturer’ The Guardian 6th September 
2014 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/jewish-museum-shooting-suspect-
islamic-state-torturer-brussels-syria [accessed 11th September 2014] 
3 Kim Willsher (2015) ‘Gunmen attack Paris magazine Charlie Hebdo offices killing at least twelve’ The 
Guardian 7th January 2015 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/satirical-french-
magazine-charlie-hebdo-attacked-by-gunmen [accessed 22nd January 2015] 
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Supermarket in Paris, killing four of the hostages before the French police 
stormed the building killing Coulibaly;4 
4. January 2015, UK, Imran Khawaja was convicted and received a prison sentence 
at the Old Baily Court in London for preparing acts of terrorism after attending a 
terrorist training camp in Syria. Khawaja spent six months in Syria fighting with 
Islamic State. Using social media sources, he faked his own death in an attempt to 
return to the UK.5  
 
The second threat is in how these terrorist groups’ skilful use of electronic communications, 
in particular social media, in radicalising EU citizens and influencing them either join these 
groups in the conflict zones or to carry out terrorist attacks in their home EU Member State. 
Currently a number of issues and accusations have been raised with the three Dawood sisters 
and their nine children from Bradford, UK who travelled to Syria to live in the Islamic State 
caliphate.6  
On Friday 26th June three terrorist attacks were carried out in France7, Kuwait8 and 
Tunisia9 that have all been linked to Islamic State. Regarding the attack in Tunisia by 
Seifeddine Rezgui has resulted in the highest number of UK causalities since the Al Qaeda 
inspired attack in London on the 7th July 2005. It is reported that Razgui was inspired and 
supported by Islamic State to carry out the attack where he killed 37 tourists on a beach and 
in a hotel in Sousse, Tunisia with the death toll of UK citizens expected to be around 30. 
These attacks demonstrate the international nature of the current terrorist threat and why it 
requires an international co-operative response. 
                                                          
4 Julian Berger (2015) Paris gunman Amedy Coulibaly declared allegiance to Isis’ The Guardian 12th January 
2015 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-gunman-amedy-coulibaly-
allegiance-isis [accessed 22nd January 2015] 
5 BBC News (2015) ‘Imran Khawaja: The jihadist who faked his own death’ 20th January 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30891145 [accessed 22nd January 2015] 
6 BBC News 2015 ‘Bradford Dawood family “split to cross Syria border”’ retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33197308 [accessed 22nd June 2015] 
7 BBC News 2015 ‘Islamic state linked to France factory beheading’ 30th June 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33332862 [accessed 1st July 2015] 
8 BBC News 2015 ‘Kuwait Shia mosque attack: Bomber was Saudi’ 28th June 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33303795 [accessed 1st July 2015] 
9 BBC News 2015 ‘Tunisia attack: what we know about what happened’ 30th June 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33304897 [accessed 1st July 2015] 
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In January 2015 Andrew Parker, the head of the UK’s intelligence agency MI5 
pointed out that under current legal conditions trying to monitor the sophisticated use of 
electronic communications by terrorist groups, it is virtually impossible to prevent every type 
of attack.10 This alarming increase in the number of citizens who have gone to Syria and Iraq 
to fight with Islamic State has led to Europol’s Director, Rob Wainwright, to warn of the 
security gap facing EU poling agencies as they try to monitor online communications of 
terrorist suspects which is compounded by the fact that by being in Syria and Iraq these 
suspects are effectively out of reach.11 His concerns centre on the difficulties the security and 
policing agencies are currently facing in monitoring electronic communications used by 
terrorists. Wainwright said that hidden areas of the Internet and encrypted communications 
are making it harder to monitor terrorist suspects, adding that Tech firms should consider the 
impact sophisticated encryption software has on law enforcement. This can range from 
blogging websites to social media sources such as Twitter where Wainwright revealed that 
Islamic State is believed to have up to 50,000 different Twitter accounts, tweeting up to 
100,000 messages a day.12 Berger and Morgan claim the number of IS Twitter accounts could 
be as high as 90,00013 thereby nearly doubling the number of daily tweets from IS. Katz  
highlights the difficulty intelligence and policing agencies face in monitoring social media 
and encrypted electronic communications, where again just using the example of Twitter, she 
                                                          
10 Security Service MI5 (2015) ‘Address by the Director-General of the Security Service, Andre Parker, to the 
Royal United Services Institute at Thames House 8th January 20-15’ retrieved from 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-
the-director-general/director-generals-speech-on-terrorism-technology-and-accountability.html [accessed 
23rd January 2015] 
11 BBC News (2015) ‘Terror threat posed by thousands of EU nationals’ 13th January 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30799637 [accessed 22nd January] 
12 BBC News 2015 ‘Europol chief warns on computer encryption’ 29th March 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32087919 [accessed 30th March 2015] 
13 Berger JM and Morgan J (2015) ‘The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS 
supporters on Twitter’ Center for Middle East Policy at Brooking, 20th March 2015 retrieved from 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:nUpiATbv50wJ:www.brookings.edu/~/media/resea
rch/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-
morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk [accessed 19th June 2015]  
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reports how IS is circumventing the blocking of their social media accounts.14 One method 
being IS account holders having multiple back-up accounts and tweet followers to follow and 
retweet up to six accounts at a time. For Katz the threat of IS on Twitter is real. She says 
Twitter alone is a launch pad for IS recruitment or calls for lone wolf attacks or to send 
dangerous messages into every corner of the world. This helps to explain why it is important 
that policing agencies co-ordinate their efforts in monitoring terrorist groups use of electronic 
communications.  
The terrorist attacks carried out in 2015 have been mainly low-level attacks with the 
use of small arms. Being relatively easy to plan and execute, it demonstrates why it is 
important that agencies work together and have the capability to monitor electronic 
communications, especially where it requires the co-operation of the internet and 
communications service providers. In relation to communications linked to terrorist activity 
we have entered the era from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’. This includes in the retention 
and sharing of electronic communications data form internet and communications service 
providers. 
 
Concerns over the Surveillance Society: The Snowden Revelations 
Granting intelligence and policing agencies wider surveillance powers generates fears 
of a surveillance society. In 2013 those fears were confirmed following the revelations by the 
former NSA employee, Edward Snowdon on the practices of the NSA and GCHQ in relation 
to Operation PRISM.15 In June 2013 the UK newspaper The Guardian and the US newspaper 
The Washington Post broke with the news story regarding the NSA and the Prism programme 
that gave US Federal agencies direct access to servers in the biggest web firms including 
                                                          
14 Katz R (2015) ‘How Islamic State is still Thriving on Twitter’ InSite Blog on Terrorism & Extremism 11th April 
2015 retrieved from http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/377-how-the-islamic-state-is-still-
thriving-on-twitter [accessed 18th June 2015] 
15 Greenwald, Glenn (2014) No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State New 
York: Metropolitan Books, pp.33-42 
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Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and Apple.16 Snowdon released top secret 
documents to a Guardian journalist, Glenn Greenwald who, in the first of a number of reports, 
revealed the NSA was collecting telephone records of millions of US customers under a top 
secret order issued in April 2013 adding that, ‘…the communication records of millions of 
US citizens are being collected indiscriminately and in bulk regardless of whether they are 
suspected of any wrongdoing’.17 Adding the NSA’s mission had transformed from being 
exclusively devoted to foreign intelligence gathering, Greenwald said it now focused on 
domestic communications. As the revelations from the documents Snowdon passed on 
regarding the FSA’s activities increased, The Guardian reported that GCHQ also gained 
access to the network of cables carrying the world’s phone calls and Internet traffic and 
processed vast streams of sensitive personal information, sharing this with the NSA.18 This 
followed on from earlier reports that GCHQ accessed the FSA’s Prism programme to secretly 
gather intelligence, where between May 2012 –April 2013, 197 Prism intelligence reports 
were passed onto the UK’s security agencies, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch’s Counter-
Terrorism Unit.19 
The shock waves of the NSA’s actions reverberated around the world, more so when it 
was revealed that politicians in the EU’s Member States were also spied on by the NSA, in 
particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.20 As Greenwald (the Guardian newspaper 
                                                          
16 BBC News 7th June 2013 ‘Web Privacy – outsourced to the US and China? Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22811002 [accessed 1st September 2013] 
17 Greenwald, G. (2013) NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily The Guardian 6th 
June 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order [accessed 1st September 2013] 
18 MacAskell, E, Borger, J., Davies, N. and Ball, J. (2013) GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to 
world’s communications The Guardian 21st June 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa [accessed 1st 
September 2013] 
19 Hopkins, N. (2013) UK gathering secret intelligence via covert NSA operation The Guardian 7th June 2013 
retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-
prism [accessed 1st September 2013] 
20 Ibid p.141  
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journalist Snowden passed the NSA documentation onto) says, what is more remarkable are 
the revelations that the NSA was spying on millions of European Citizen adding; 
‘…in addition to foreign leaders the United states … also spied extensively on 
international organisations such as the United Nations to gain a diplomatic 
advantage.’21  
During this dialogue the difference in legal culture between the EU and the US raised 
its head regarding individual’s rights in the respective jurisdictions with the EU’s focus being 
the dignity of citizens. In protecting fundamental human rights under the aegis of the rule of 
law the EU requires a system of protection of an individual citizen’s data privacy.22 There is 
no such explicit protection to a general right to privacy under the US Bill of Rights rather it is 
inferred in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.23 This is important as Snowdon’s 
revelations had the potential to damage not only diplomatic relations between the US and EU 
Member States, but also affect the terrorism intelligence sharing between European counter-
terrorism agencies via Europol and US federal agencies. While understanding the concerns of 
a surveillance society, a balance has to be drawn between the needs of protecting the interests 
of security within the EU’s Member States and the rights of individual citizens. 
UK Liberty Civil Liberty Groups’ Concerns Regarding Widening Surveillance 
on Electronic Communications Data  
 In March 2015 the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) 
published is report on privacy and security. By being developed piecemeal, the ISC found the 
UK’s legal framework regarding surveillance, especially on electronic communications is 
unnecessarily complicated raising concerns over a, ‘…lack of transparency, which is not in 
                                                          
21 Ibid p.142 
22 Murphy, C.C. (2012) EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
p.149 
23 Whitman, J.Q. (2004) The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty 113 Yale Law Journal 
1151—1221, p.1155 
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the public interest.’24 As a result, among its recommendations is that all the current legal 
frameworks on surveillance are replaced with a new Act of Parliament.25 In this 
recommendation the ISC stated that as human rights obligations can constrain surveillance 
practices they emphasised the requirement for transparency and reporting when such powers 
are used.26 
 Surprisingly the ISC’s findings have not been universally welcomed. The UK civil 
liberties group, Liberty have no confidence in the ISC’s ability to, ‘…provide effective 
oversight of the security agencies’.27 Underpinning this claim is Liberty’s perception that by 
being understaffed and under-funded the ISC has insufficient expertise, which leads them to 
consistently fail to criticise the UK’s intelligence. Liberty say the ISC act more like, ‘…a 
spokesperson of the agencies than a credible oversight body.’28 
When members of four UK privacy campaign groups gave evidence to the ISC’s 
inquiry into privacy and security, the ISC asked them if evidence emerged through bulk data 
collection terrorist attacks were being prevented, would they still believe so strongly that 
under any circumstances bulk data collection is so unacceptable that terrorist attacks is a price 
a free society has to pay. The four privacy campaigners said it was with Isabella Sankey, the 
director of policy of the Liberty saying, ‘Yes …That is the price you pay to live in a free 
society.’29 When asked by the Committee if her view would change if the electronic bulk data 
collection was authorised under a legal framework, Sankey’s reply was, ‘No’.30 For some this 
response may appear astounding and irresponsible while for others this stance is plausible. 
                                                          
24 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015) ‘Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent 
legal framework’ London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, p/2 
25 Ibid p. 118 
26 Ibid pp.118-119 
27 Liberty (2014) ‘Liberty’s evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s inquiry into Privacy and 
Security’ retrieved from http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/ [accessed 20th March 2015] p.4 
28 Ibid, p.4 paragraph 5 
29 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament  (see note 21) pp. 35-36 
30 Ibid p.36 
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This shows how polarised views are on practises related to surveillance of electronic 
communications that gathers bulk data collection. This could be due to the nature of the 
communications that comes under legislation related to surveillance and data retention. 
The Communications Data Subject of Wider Surveillance 
 The electronic communications data subject in many states’ recent and proposed 
legislation granting further powers of surveillance includes communication data that 
details of the time, duration, originator and recipient of communication. In common 
parlance this is, ‘…the who, when and where of communication, but not the content of 
the communication itself’.31 Breaking it down to three distinct categories, 
communications data includes: 
1. Traffic Data –where communications are or may be transmitted through a 
telecommunications system that identifies a person, the apparatus used or the 
location to and from the communication is made. It can identify or select the 
apparatus by which the communication is transmitted. Traffic data comprises of 
signals for the actuation of the apparatus used for the purposes of a 
telecommunications system for effecting the transmission of the communication. 
It also can identify the time at which the communication occurs or can identify 
the data comprised in or associated with the communication; 
2. Use Data – relates to the actual information related to the use made by the 
person of a telecommunications service or is in connection with the provision or 
sue by a person of a telecommunications system, but does not contain the 
contents of any communication. In other words it is simply the data relating to 
the use made by a person of a communications service; 
3. Subscriber Data – this is the information held or obtained by the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) or Communications Service Providers (CSP) where the 
information is about the person using the service provided by the ISP or CSP. 
This will include information on people who are subscribers to an ISP or CSP 
without necessarily using that service and those who use communications 
without necessarily subscribing to it32 
This is bulk data and while not being able to see the content of communications, it 
allows intelligence and policing agencies to trace and acquire information on the 
movements of a person. It is essential that in allowing such agencies to carry out 
                                                          
31 Simon McKay (2015) ‘Covert Policing: Law and Practice’ (2nd edition) Oxford: Oxford university Press, p.129 
32 Ibid, pp.129-130, UK Draft Communications Data Bill 2012 p.7, Home Office (2014) ‘Retention of 
Communications Data: Code of Practice’ London: HMSO, paragraph 2.7 
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surveillance on electronic communications data that stringent controls are in place 
protecting privacy and data protection. 
Summary of UK Surveillance Powers on Electronic Communications Data 
 This section looks at the key pieces of UK legislation governing surveillance of 
electronic communications. From just these examples one can see why it is perceived the law 
governing surveillance of electronic communications data is complex and how it has been 
developed piecemeal. This was a point that led to the ISC stating that by being developed in a 
piecemeal way the law is unnecessarily complicated giving the ISC serious concerns 
regarding the lack of transparency, which they rightly claim is not in the public interest.33 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
 The two RIPA authorities worth discussing are interception warrants and acquisition 
of data authorities, issued by the Secretary of State in relation to the surveillance of electronic 
communications data available to the intelligence and policing agencies in the UK. The main 
difference between the two authorities is an interception warrant is in relation to 
investigations where an individual is suspected to have involvement in acts of terrorism or 
serious criminal activity. An interception warrant allows the intelligence and policing 
agencies to monitor targeted individual’s use of various forms of communication. An 
authority to acquire communications data is in essence an authority requiring Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) and Communications Service Provider’s (CSP) to disclose communications 
data they hold intelligence and policing agencies believe would assist an investigation.  
Interception Warrants 
Part 1 of RIPA allows for the interception, acquisition and disclosure of 
communications data by state agencies authorised to do so. Section 5 RIPA allows the 
Secretary of State to issue an interception warrant to obtain information about the 
                                                          
33 Intelligence and Security Committee (see note 21) p.2 
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communications a person is using both in the UK and in territory outside the UK.34 An 
interception warrant can only be issued where it is proportionate to do so and necessary on 
the grounds of national security, or to prevent or detect serious crime or it is for the purpose 
of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK.35 An interception warrant can only be 
issued when the application is made by or on behalf of: 
1. The Director-General of the Security Service (MI5); 
2. The Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); 
3. The Director of GCHQ; 
4. Director of the National Crime Agency; 
5. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Northern Ireland Police Service 
and chief constables in the rest of Britain; 
6. The Commissioner of HM Customs and Revenue; 
7. The Chief of Defence Intelligence; 
8. A person who for the purposes of any international mutual assistance agreement is 
the competent authority of a country or territory outside the UK.36 
 
Important for the interception warrants is that it names either the person as the interception 
subject or the premises where the interception is to take place.37 As circumstances can change 
during an investigation thereby altering the focus of that investigation, RIPA allows for the 
Secretary of State to modify the provision in the interception warrant.38 
 Regarding safeguards that are in place the Secretary of State must specify the number 
of persons to whom the data is disclosed or made available, the extent to which the data is 
disclosed or made available, and the extent to which the data is copied along with the number 
of copies made.39 The communications data is to be destroyed as soon as there are no longer 
any grounds for retaining it40 and where it is retained, it can only be done so on the grounds it 
                                                          
34 s.4 RIPA 
35 s.5 RIPA 
36 s.6 RIPA 
37 s.8 RIPA 
38 s.10 RIPA 
39 s.15 (2) RIPA 
40 s.15(3) RIPA 
14 
 
is necessary in the interests of national security, to prevent or detect crime or disorder or for 
safeguarding ten economic well-being of the UK.41 
Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data 
 Part I Chapter II RIPA allows the Secretary of State to authorise intelligence and 
policing agencies42 to obtain communications data where, among the qualifications for the 
state to interfere with the right to privacy it is believed to be necessary in the interests of 
national security, or to prevent or detect crime, or it is in the interests of the economic well-
being of the UK, or it is in the interests of public safety.43 The authorisation notice must be in 
writing, describing the category of communications data the authority applies to.44 Where the 
authority is for communications providers to disclose data in their possession45 the authority 
must describe the communications data the provider has to obtain and disclose, specifying the 
reason why (that is on the grounds of it being necessary in the interests of national security or 
one of the reasons given in s. 22(2) RIPA) and specify the manner in which disclosure is to 
be made.46 Where it is either no longer necessary or proportionate for the requirements of the 
notice to be complied with, the notice shall be cancelled.47 
RIPA Safeguards: The Interception of Communications Commissioner and Tribunal 
 Under RIPA the UK Prime Minister has to appoint an Interception of 
Communications Commissioner48 whose role is to give the Tribunal assistance in relation any 
investigation by the Tribunal49 and to keep under review the exercise of any power the 
Secretary of State makes under RIPA.50 A Commissioner must either hold or have held 
                                                          
41 S.15(4)(a) RIPA 
42 s. 25(1) RIPA 
43 s.22(2) RIPA 
44 s.23(1) RIPA 
45 s.22(4) RIPA 
46 s.23(2) RIPA 
47 S.23(9) RIPA 
48 S. 57(1) RIPA 
49s.57(3)(a) RIPA 
50 s.57(4) RIPA 
15 
 
judicial office.51 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is granted under section 7 Human Rights Act 
1998 to investigate complaints that a public body has not acted in a manner that is compatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)52 and to consider complaints made 
by persons who are aggrieved as to the conduct of those who have carried out surveillance 
authorities.53 A person can only challenge conduct where the surveillance authority was 
issued the Secretary of State, not where an authority is granted by a judicial authority.54 
A RIPA authorisation must be compatible with the provisions of the ECHR and we 
can see how article 8 (right to privacy and family life) ECHR is incorporated into the 
conditions for granting both the interception warrants and the authorities requiring disclosure 
of communications data.  UK liberty groups such as Big Brother Watch do not see these 
safeguards as sufficient regarding data protection.  In the group’s 2014 report on the police 
use of RIPA they see the safeguards as inadequate and there should be more stringent 
safeguards, especially on ‘non-suspects’ communications data saying that under the current 
conditions: 
‘…in our view a court would probably hold that the restrictions on retention, 
storage and reproduction of external contents data and communications data are 
insufficiently robust, and that the UK is therefore in violation of its article 
obligations’55 
 
To date these RIPA sections have not been successfully challenged in the courts. This may 
due to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Klass v Germany who 
examined article 8 ECHR. While acknowledging that surveillance is a necessary evil in a 
democracy, held that when the state carries out covert surveillance its actions must be 
                                                          
51 s.57(5) RIPA 
52 s.65(2)(a) RIPA 
53 s.64(2)(b) RIPA 
54 S.65(7) RIPA 
55 Big Brother Watch (2014) ‘Briefing Note: Why Communications Data (Metadata) Matter’ retrieved from 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_dnTKjWRKNEJ:www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Communications-Data-Briefing.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk [accessed 30th 
April 2015] 
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proportionate.56 It appears to be the fact the Commissioner scrutinising authority applications 
must hold or have held a judicial office that has to date satisfied the courts. 
 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA) 
 This Act applies to the three UK intelligence services, the Secret Intelligence Service 
(commonly referred to as MI6), the Security Service (commonly referred to as MI5) and 
GCHQ. It is aimed at legislating for their main surveillance practices, in particular GCHQ’s 
interference with the various forms of communication it monitors.57 The ISA also allows for 
surveillance warrants to be authorised under s.5 by the respective Secretary of State for the 
respective agencies (Foreign Secretary for MI6 and the Home Secretary or MI5 and GCHQ) 
to interfere with property or wireless telegraphy where the action is proportionate. For the: 
1. Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) it has to be in the interests of national security 
especially in relation to the defence and foreign policies of the UK Government, or is 
in the economic interests of the UK or is to support the prevention or detection of  
serious crime; 
2. Security Service (MI5) it has to be when it is carrying out its functions under the 
Security Service Act 1989. Under the 1989 Act those functions are the protection of 
national security, in particular threats from espionage, terrorism, sabotage, activities 
of agents of foreign powers or activities intended to overthrow parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means. Other functions include protecting 
ten economic interests of the UK and in supporting the actions of police forces and the 
National Crime Agency;58  
3. GCHQ when it is carrying out a function in the interests of national security, 
especially with reference to the defence and foreign policies of the UK, or in 
protecting the economic interests of the UK or in support of the prevention or 
detection of crime.59 
 
These three agencies can also utilise the power under sections 5 and 25 RIPA regarding 
intrusion warrants and authorities for data disclosure as well the above ISA warrant to 
conduct surveillance. One can see that there are slight differences in the grounds for 
requesting an authority under ISA compared to RIPA, as they include the function of the 
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defence of the UK and with regard to MI5, one can see the wide area of activity covered 
under s.1 Security Services Act 1989 this agency can get interfere with.  
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 (WTA) 
 Section 48 WTA allows a person under an authority granted by the Secretary of State 
and Commissioners of Revenue and Customs60 a broad power to intercept wireless or other 
communication with intent to obtain information as to the content of that communication, the 
details of the sender or addressee of the message.61 As seen with RIPA, an interception 
authority under the WTA must be necessary and includes among others one of the following 
grounds: 
1. Where it is in the interests of national security; 
2. For the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or disorder; 
3. Where it is in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK; 
4. Where it is in the interests of public safety; 
5. For the purpose of protecting public health.62 
 
The authority must be in writing63 and the authority may be general or specific, given to such 
a person for a specified period with the authority being subject to restrictions and 
limitations.64 
 In relation to RIPA interception warrants there appears to be little operational 
distinction between that and the WTA interception authority, as Anderson notes, both 
authorities might be used to intercept the same communications.65 The WTA authority is 
more likely to be used by the UK intelligence services than the police, who will be more 
inclined to use RIPA authorities. 
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The Digital Rights Case and the UK Response  
In April 2014 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Digital Rights66 the 
provisions related to data protection and privacy rights under the 2006 Data Retention 
Directive67  were invalid because they lacked specificity and sufficiency. As a result the 
UK introduced the Data Retention and Investigatory Act 2014 (DRIPA).  
Digital Rights Case 
 The case centred mainly on Directive 2006/24/EC that lays down the obligation on 
the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or public 
communications networks to retain certain data generated or processed by them. The ECJ 
also considered the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the Member States’ legal 
provisions regarding the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms especially in the 
processing of personal data in the electronic sector processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy. In essence the ECJ found that both of the Directives were invalid in 
relation to data retention processed in connection with the provision of available electronic 
communications data. Key to this decision was article 4 of the 2006 Directive that states 
Member States shall adopt measures to ensure that data retained is provided only to the 
competent national authorities in specific cases in accordance with national law adding: 
‘The procedures to be followed and the conditions to be fulfilled ion order to gain 
access to retained data in accordance with necessity and proportionality 
requirements shall be defined by each Member state in its national law, subject to 
the relevant provisions of EU law or public international law and in particular the 
[European Convention on Human Rights] as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights’68 
The ECJ said that EU legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope 
and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards so that persons 
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whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal 
data against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access and use of that data.69 
 Looking at the inadequacies of article 4 in the 2006 Directive the ECJ held that 
article 4 did not expressly provide that access to the use of the data was strictly restricted for 
the purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting 
criminal prosecutions relating to such crimes; all the conditions specified in article 4 as that 
Member States defined procedures to followed that were in accordance with necessity and 
proportionality requirements.70 Examining the provisions of article 7 of the 2006 Directive 
regarding data protection and security that the ECJ said should be read in conjunction with 
article 4 held that it does not ensure a particularly high level of protection and security and 
the Directive as a whole did not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of 
the data retention period.71 The ECJ did recognise the importance of data retention in relation 
to investigations into serious crime and terrorism saying: 
‘…it is of the upmost importance in order to ensure public security and its 
effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation 
techniques’72 
In saying this, the ECJ decided the 2006 Directive’s data retention measures were too vague 
to even justify these objectives as the rationale for the data retention. Simply stating retention 
should be carried out under the principles of necessity and be proportionality cannot be 
justified in imposing limitations on citizens’ rights as the imposition of limitations requires a 
legitimate aim and terrorism is certainly a legitimate aim that is recognised as one that meets 
the objective s of general interest recognised by the EU and that includes corresponding with 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, including the important right, the right 
                                                          
69 Digital Rights Case C-293/12, paragraph 54 
70 Digital Rights Case C-293/12, paragraph 61 
71 Digital Rights Case C-293/12, paragraph 67 
72 Digital Rights Case C-298/12, paragraph 51 
20 
 
to life. In his analysis of the Digital Rights Case Ojanen states, the more systemic and wide 
the collection, retention and analysis of bulk data becomes: 
‘…the closer it can be seen as moving towards the core area of privacy and data 
protection with the outcome that at least the most massive, systematic forms of 
collection and analysis of [bulk data] can be regarded as constituting an intrusion 
into the inviolable core of privacy and data protection’73 
 
Ojanen recognised, the ECJ decision in Digital Rights is not a ‘total knockout’ to mandatory 
retention.74 The EU requires form its Member states when drawing up legislation to specify 
the legitimate aim for the retention. Examples of specificity include acts of terrorism or 
serious organised crime such as human trafficking. The legislation must also specify realistic 
periods of data retention and provide sufficient safeguards into protecting rights of privacy 
and data protection. 
Key Provisions in DRIPA 
Section 1 DRIPA allows the Secretary of State to issue a notice to ISP and CSP’s to 
retain relevant communications data (a retention notice) if the Secretary of State 
considers the requirement to be necessary and proportionate. Again similar 
qualifications as seen in RIPA must apply for the notice to be issued and they include 
the likes of national security, to prevent crime or disorder, the UK’s economic interests, 
and the protection of public health.75 Where these conditions exist the retention notice 
can relate to a particular operator or any description of operators where the notice will 
require the retention of all data or of the type described in the notice and specify the 
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period the data should be detained,76 with the maximum period of data retention not 
exceeding 12 months.77 In order to make requests on ISP and CSP’s on a lawful footing, 
DRIPA has amended section 5 (3) RIPA (that is concerned with the grounds necessary 
for issuing of warrants to intercept communications) adding the issuing of a warrant is 
necessary where in the circumstances it appears to the Secretary of State the warrant is 
relevant to the interests of national security.78  
 Where a nation state legislates the granting of powers for the likes of retention 
notices and warrants is all well and good when applying to companies located within 
that state, but the law of one state is not normally applicable to companies located 
outside that state. As many ISP and CSP’s are located outside the UK, it can in effect 
make these powers redundant. DRIPA has tried to address this issue by amending RIPA 
to allow for an interception warrant to be delivered at the company’s principal office 
within the UK. If that company does not have a principal office at any place in the UK 
is where that company carries on their business or conducts its activities.79 Should there 
still be non-compliance by that company located outside the UK to the warrant, DRIPA 
amends section 11 of RIPA to give effect that the warrant is enforceable by civil 
proceedings.80 To assist in ensuring there are ways of improving the access of 
electronic communications data, the UK appointed its former US Ambassador, Sir 
Nigel Sheinwald as special envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data sharing. 
His role is lead discussions with key international partners and ISP and CSP’s seeking 
to: 
                                                          
76 S.1(2) Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
77 S1(5) Data retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
78 S.3(2) Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
79 S4(2) Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
80 S.4(5) Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
22 
 
1. Identify ways of taking forward the UK Government’s relationships with ISP 
and CSP’s to ensure the UK Government’s work is coherent with its broader 
relationship with these providers; 
2. Consider wider international arrangements in this area; 
3. Ensure that any new arrangements observe the requirement that data is 
requested and provided only where necessary and proportionate for the purposes 
of national security and the prevention or detection of serious crime; 
4. Other measure to work with the US on the range of options to strengthen 
reliable access through Mutual legal Assistance Treaty systems, other legal or 
political frameworks or remedies for better arrangements for direct requests 
form UK agencies to companies that hold the data.81 
 
However DRIPA has a sunset clause where the Act is due to expire in December 2016 
requiring the UK to either continue with this Act (following a House of Commons 
debate on the issue) or to let it expire and introduce a new Act. 
The Investigatory Powers Bill: Is there a need for further legislation? 
 Following the Conservative Party’s 2015 General Election victory, the Queen’s 
Speech outlining the legislation the new UK Government would introduce during the 2015/16 
Parliament was delivered on the 27th May 2015. The UK Government proposes to introduce 
the Investigatory Powers Bill giving UK intelligence and policing agencies greater powers to 
monitor Internet and telephone use. The UK Government claim the Bill will address the gaps 
in intelligence gathering and enable the agencies to access communications data that is 
putting lives at risk, saying it will provide the authorities with the, ‘…tools to keep you and 
your family safe.’82 A UK Government document says the purpose of the Investigatory 
Powers Bill will be to: 
1. Address ongoing capability gaps that are severely degrading the ability of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies ability to combat terrorism and other serious 
crime; 
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2. Maintain the ability of UK intelligence agencies and law enforcement to target the 
online communications of terrorists, paedophiles and other serious criminals; 
3. Modernise the UK’s law in the areas of terrorism and serious crime and ensure it is 
fit for purpose; 
4. Provide for appropriate oversight and safeguard arrangements.83 
 
The UK Government claims this Bill will enable the intelligence services and police to meet 
their operational requirements by addressing the gap in their ability to build on intelligence 
and evidence where suspects have communicated online. 
 UK civil liberty groups are concerned the impact the Bill will have on rights to 
privacy and data protection. Jim Killock from Open Rights Group sees the Bill as signalling 
the UK Government’s desire to press ahead with increased powers of data collection and 
retention, allowing the police and GCHQ to spy on everyone whether or not they are suspects 
of committing a crime or not, adding: 
‘We should expect attacks on encryption, which protects all our security. Data 
collection will create vast and unnecessary expense’84 
Renate Samson from Big Brother Watch is sceptical if there is a security gap questioning if 
there is any real evidence of a gap in the capability of law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies’ ability to gain access to communications data. She said, ‘Any new draft legislation 
must acknowledge that the bigger the haystacks the harder it will be to find the needles.’ 85 
 At the moment one can only guess the Bill’s contents, but it could be similar to the 
Communications Data Bill presented to the UK Parliament in June 2012 during the 2010-
2015 Coalition Government that was blocked by the Liberal Democrat members of the 
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Coalition who saw the proposed measures being too intrusive.86 The most controversial 
points in the Communications Data Bill were under the following clauses. Clause 1 proposed 
to give the relevant Secretary of State power to issue an order to ensure that communications 
data is made available to the appropriate authorities by ISP and CSP’s. Clause 4 regarding the 
period the ISP and CSP’s must retain the data. Clauses 5 and 9 regarding authorisation to and 
access to data by the intelligence and policing agencies, where Clause 9 proposed that ISP 
and CSP’s disclose the details of persons those agencies suspected to be involved in terrorism 
or serious criminal activity provided it was necessary and proportionate under the conditions 
seen in RIPA and DRIPA (that is conditions such as national security or to prevent or detect 
crime and disorder). It is expected that similar clauses will be contained in the Investigatory 
Powers Bill. 
 It is hoped that the Investigatory Powers Bill will be a standalone piece of legislation 
repealing sections of RIPA, ISA and WTA providing sufficient safeguards in relation to 
rights to privacy and data protection. It is important the Bill is clear in what electronic 
communications is subject of surveillance to prevent any confusion and to appease citizens as 
to what type of and why certain communications are being examined by the intelligence and 
policing agencies. In addition to this to all surveillance authority applications must be specific 
as to why they are necessary, clearly stating the nature of the investigation and the grounds as 
to why such an authority is needed. It is also important that all authority applications are 
authorised by the judiciary not a Secretary of State. Anderson’s 2015 report sums up why 
judicial authority should be sought as it would: 
1. Improve public confidence;87  
2. Judges’ experience of police attitudes and methods renders them qualified to assess if 
an application is truly necessary (and the police have high professional respect for the 
judiciary; and 
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3. It meets the requirements of the Digital Rights decision and ECHR regarding the 
requirements of data protection and rights to privacy.88 
Conclusion 
Returning to the question whether the UK needs a new piece of legislation governing 
surveillance of electronic communications data, it is submitted it does. While RIPA appears 
to contain wide surveillance power, the UK Parliament’s ISC report on privacy and security 
described RIPA as, ‘an analogue law in a digital age.89 When RIPA was introduced in 2000 
the use of electronic communications was limited compared to 2015. In 2000 there was no 
broadband facility, mobile phones allowed its users to telephone or text whereas to day the 
mobile phone is a small computer and of course social media did not exist in 2000. The ISA 
is also showing a sign of aging as legislation struggles to keep up with technology advances 
in communications. As most people’s use of the internet ranges from a wide range of 
activities such as entertainment to shopping to banking carried out on various forms from 
personal computers, tablets and mobile phones, never before has the safety of data protection 
been so paramount. Therefore it is an imperative that Anderson’s recommendation is 
included in that Investigatory Powers Bill by only allowing authorisations to be granted 
following judicial scrutiny. Equally important is the ability of the UK intelligence and 
policing agencies are granted powers of surveillance of electronic communications under one 
piece of legislation that is clear as to what can be monitored and is specific and proportionate 
to the investigation carried out by those agencies.  
In the last twelve months we have witnessed a more sophisticated approach in the use 
of communications by terrorist groups. This has applied to Islamic State whose social media 
use has been very effective in communicating their messages to encourage others to join their 
cause, be it to travel to the caliphate to fight or live or in radicalising individuals to carry out 
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attacks outside the caliphate. Internet and communications service providers can play a vital 
role in assisting intelligence and policing agencies by retaining communications data they 
suspect to be linked to terrorist activity and pass this on. As stated, due to the current terrorist 
threat we have moved to an era form ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’. This is important as 
these agencies need the tools to protect the most important of all human rights, the right to 
life of the citizens they serve. This should ensure that two key safety issues are protected, the 
safety of a person’s communications data and the safety of people’s lives. 
 
 
 
 
